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In a centralized federation, where tax rates and taxation rules are set by the federal govern-
ment, manipulating the thoroughness of tax auditing and the effectiveness of tax collection 
could be attractive for regional authorities because of a variety of reasons. These range from 
tax competition to principal-agent problems, state capture and benefits of fiscal equalisation. 
In this paper we discuss strategic tax auditing and collection from the perspective of fiscal 
federalism and test for strategic tax collection empirically using data of the Russian Federa-
tion. Russia’s regional authorities in the 1990s have always been suspect of tax auditing ma-
nipulations in their favour. However, in the 2000s increasing bargaining power of the centre 
seems to induce tax collection bodies in the regions to manipulate tax auditing in favour of the 
federation. We find partial evidence in favour of both of these hypotheses. 
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University of Mannheim 




Lars P. Feld 
University of Heidelberg 
Alfred-Weber-Institute 






   
 
This version: June 5, 2007. First Version: December 24, 2006. 
We thank Mikhail Golovnin, Oleg Ryhtikov, Ekaterina Klyusheva and Daria Ushkalova 
(Institute of Economics RAS), Vladimir Popov (New Economic School) and Vladimir 
Klimanov (Institute for Public Finance) for help by collecting data for the research. We are 
also grateful to Daniel Treisman for comments on the sources of data. The paper was 
presented at the First World Meeting of the Public Choice Societies in Amsterdam in March 
2007. The authors thank the discussant and the participants, in particular Stefan Voigt, for 
helpful suggestions. All mistakes remain our own. – 2 – 
1. Introduction 
  In centralized federations with administrative powers of the sub-federal jurisdictions 
(administrative federalism), where the federal government sets the tax rates, tax base defini-
tions and the rules of tax collection, tax auditing often remains the only instrument available 
for regions to design their own tax policy. Indeed, there is some (so far mostly anecdotal) evi-
dence for several federations, that different regions have different degrees of thoroughness in 
enforcing tax laws. In Germany, rich and poor states (Länder) are supposedly less severe in 
their tax auditing activity to compete for mobile taxpayers (Baretti, Huber and Lichtblau, 
2002; Stöwhase and Traxler, 2005). In Belgium, the Flemish region has also been repeatedly 
accused of being relatively lax in its tax auditing (Cremer and Gahvari, 2000). Occasionally 
regional governments even provide different support to local businesses to avoid federal taxa-
tion and legislation (Cai and Treisman, 2004). And, naturally, this issue becomes more impor-
tant in the developing and transformation economies, since a deficit of the rule of law pro-
vides additional opportunities for regional governments and enterprises. 
There are several reasons for regional governments to reduce their efforts in tax audit-
ing and collection. In a tax competition framework enforcement policy acts as an instrument 
to attract mobile capital, if direct changes of tax rates are impossible. In a way, regions com-
pete by “sheltering” firms from federal taxation or other interventions (Cai and Treisman, 
2004; Sonin, 2005). This activity becomes especially important, if the degree of state capture 
at the regional level is higher than at the level of the federation, and influential firms seek pro-
tection of the regional authorities from the (uncontrolled) centre (Treisman, 1999). From the 
perspective of vertical fiscal relations, if benefits from federal grants exceed potential losses 
from lower tax collection and fiscal transfers depend upon deficits of regional budgets, a bad 
standing in tax collection could be attractive for regional governments (Stöwhase and Traxler, 
2005). Finally, federal government could also be interested in reducing its tax collection ef-
fort. In this case different tax auditing policies in different regions act as an instrument of spa-
tial redistribution or business subsidizing, if direct grants or transfers are politically undesir-
able (Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya, 2004). The central question then becomes who is effec-
tively controlling tax authorities in the regions. 
Moreover, strategic tax auditing and collection could be applied as a way of de-facto 
fiscal decentralisation, measured by distribution of tax revenue between the federation and the 
states. As auditing effort is often not directly observable, it could create a principal-agent 
problem. There is no reason to believe, that regions (if they control tax auditing activities) are 
equally thorough to enforce tax laws, when a larger share of the tax revenue collected is attri-
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buted to the federal government, as compared to taxes, which mostly benefit regional budgets. 
It is thus possible to hypothesize that tax arrears would mostly accumulate on expense of the 
federation, i.e. taxes with a higher regional share are more actively collected than those which 
are mostly attributed to the centre. On the contrary, the federation can also be interested in the 
“hidden” re-centralisation through strategic tax collection. In this paper we test these hypothe-
ses empirically using data of the Russian Federation. To our knowledge, the paper is one of 
the first attempts of empirical investigation of the strategic tax collection hypothesis.  
There are several factors, which make Russia an interesting case for the studies of 
strategic tax collection. First, during the 1990s, tax collection in Russia experienced a signifi-
cant decline; the situation improved in the 2000s under the new administration, but the share 
of shadow economy still remains significant. Therefore selective application of tax collection 
instruments seems to be a reasonable assumption for the behaviour of tax authorities in this 
environment (as compared to countries with high tax morale). Second, Russian regions are 
suspect of manipulating the tax collection throughout the 1990s: both because of a de-iure 
highly centralized federal structure, but de-facto increasing unilateral devolution. Third, 
changes of tax collection behaviour from Yeltsin to Putin offer an important “natural experi-
ment”, which can be used to understand how shifts of relative bargaining power between the 
centre and the regions affects tax auditing and collection behaviour. However, the “shadow 
side” of the advantages are potential difficulties by modelling Russian federalism econometri-
cally. On the one hand, Russia has been an extremely asymmetric country both in terms of 
political, economic and fiscal structure. It suggests potential impact of outliers on the estima-
tion results. On the other hand, transition from Yeltsin to Putin can also pose certain model-
ling problems, for example the timing of changes. We develop a four-stage estimation strate-
gies in order to account for these difficulties. 
Our paper is complementary to Treisman (1999, 2003), who also discusses the influ-
ence of decentralisation on tax arrears; but unlike Treisman, we attempt to find out, how the 
strategic tax auditing policy changed during the evolution of Russian federalism in the 1990s 
and 2000s. Our data set covers the period between 1995 and 2003, and therefore does not only 
include the first term of Yeltsin’s presidency, but also his second term and a significant part 
of Putin’s first term. To our knowledge, this paper is thus also one of the first attempts to ap-
ply tools of empirical research to explicitly studying the changes in Russian fiscal federalism 
under Putin in the 2000s. We also use an alternative logic of explanation: Treisman’s assump-
tion is that different shares of regions in total tax collection make them more or less lax in tax 
auditing activity, i.e. fiscal decentralisation is an exogenous variable, influencing political de-
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cisions on tax collection effort. In this paper we argue, that differences in tax revenue distri-
bution across the federation result from different tax auditing activity, or that fiscal decentrali-
sation is an endogenous process caused by strategic tax policy.  
The paper is organized as follows: the next section provides a brief overview of Rus-
sian federalism and the reasons for strategic tax auditing in this institutional setting. The third 
section presents our main hypotheses and discusses the theoretical background for the study. 
The fourth section describes the methodology and data. The fifth section presents our findings 
for all four steps of analysis (annual cross-sections, panel data, TSLS and median regressions) 
and discusses their potential implications. The last section concludes.  
2.  Strategic tax collection and Russian fiscal federalism 
The development of Russian federalism in the 1990s was characterized by the interre-
lation of two different aspects of its structure: high formal centralisation and high economic, 
political and fiscal asymmetry both inherited from the historical development and resulting 
from transition, in particular from the process of unilateral devolution and bilateral bargaining 
between the federation and the regions. Formal centralisation reduces the toolbox of legal in-
struments available for the regions to design their tax policy; high asymmetry increases de-
mand for region-specific policies (due to both economic conditions and heterogeneous prefer-
ences of the elites and the population) and also (potentially) creates differences in the bargain-
ing power of individual regions vis-à-vis the federation and (more important) individual fed-
eral agencies and their regional branches. Under these conditions strategic tax collection and 
auditing become both possible and desirable at least for several regions. 
In the early 1990s, the share of taxes attributed to the federal centre was set individu-
ally for every region and all issues of inter-budgetary relations were determined by negotia-
tions between regions and the centre. However, since 1994 Russian regions have been very 
limited in their tax authorities. The exclusive list of taxes is set by the federal parliament, and 
all taxes are collected by the unified federal tax service, although tax revenue is split between 
federal, regional and municipal budgets. Taxes in Russia are either joint taxes or, even if they 
are completely attributed to the region, the tax rate is still within the authority of the centre. 
The distribution of tax revenue between the federal centre and the regions is prescribed by the 
federal legislation (or by the individual decisions of the federal government in case of the so-
called “regulating taxes”). For some taxes, regions were entitled to change the regional rate of 
taxation (even reducing it to zero), but only within the scale set by the federation and for taxes 
set by the federation.  
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This de-iure highly centralized federal order was implemented in an extremely hetero-
geneous country. Different regions of Russia are characterized by different resource endow-
ments and industrial capacities, different population structure and different access to transpor-
tation infrastructure and markets. Moreover, Russian regions often differ significantly in 
terms of their political system and organisation of decision making from the point of view of 
both informal rules and partly formal institutions. During the 1990s this heterogeneity was 
supplemented by a strong political asymmetry, resulting from the effort of Russian regions to 
achieve greater autonomy. Partly this activity took place within the framework of direct bilat-
eral bargaining between federal and regional governments, leading to the establishment of 
formal power-sharing treaties, which are often referred to as basic elements of an asymmetric 
federation (Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 2004, Chapter 4). On the other hand, federal 
law (acts of the parliament and also presidential decrees) was also used to give additional au-
thorities to regions. More important from the point of view of this paper is the unilateral activ-
ity of regions leading to devolution. Its most prominent forms included “the war of laws” (in-
troduction of regional legislation running contrary to the federal one) or tax withholding.  
Finally, Russia has also been characterized be enormous de-facto asymmetry in tax 
revenue distribution. In the period between 1994 and 2004 the share of taxes received by the 
centre from different regions varied from practically zero (Sakha in 1994 and 1995) to more 
than 95% (Kalmykia in 2005). Figure 1 presents the distribution of Russian regions according 
to their share in the tax revenue from their territory. An obvious  reason for the heterogeneity 
are differences in composition of tax base or political privileges. However, these factors only 
partly account for the observed asymmetries. Surprisingly, the “notorious” forms of unilateral 
devolution mentioned above also do not seem to explain the asymmetric structure in the tax 
collection. Although the significant differences between the federal and the local regulation 
existed until the early 2000s (Chang, 2005), the possibilities for tax withholdings went down 
relatively quickly. While in 1993 about 30 regions declared tax-withholding plans, not a sin-
gle one really implemented them. In 1996 St. Petersburg was the only region withholding 
20% of the land tax revenue. Institutional factors like development of the federal tax service 
contributed much to this change: as Lavrov (2005) puts it, since 1994 regions did not pay 
taxes to the centre, it is the centre, which provides funding to the regions. There were only 
seldom attempts of open “budgetary separatism” in the 1990s. After the crisis of 1998 several 
regions announced potential tax withholding, and the parliament of Kalmykia (one of the na-
tional republics in the Southern part of Russia) decided to stop payments to the federal 
budget, but quick and severe actions of the federations (e.g. the Ministry of Finance stopped 
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funding federal programs on the Kalmykian territory) resulted in abolition of this regulation. 
Moreover, the major advantages obtained by the regions by the bilateral treaties were of non-
fiscal nature – control over oil and gas exploration in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan and for 
diamond industry in Sakha. The first two treaties with Tatarstan and Bashkortostan allowed 
these republics to receive all excises and rental payments for the natural resources instead of 
federal centre. However, Sakha, the third region, which was only able to enforce the special 
privileged regime to use part of the federal taxes collected on its territory for funding of fed-
eral program, i.e. a limitation was put rather on the expenditure than the revenue side of the 
budget. Later treaties either did not include any fiscal arrangements, or were mostly  based on 
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Figure 1: Distribution of regions according to the region’s share in total taxes collected. 
Sources: Goskomstat, Ministry of Finance, Federal Tax Service, Federal Treasury, Freink-
man, Treisman and Titov, 1999 
Therefore it is reasonable to look for alternative instruments able to establish a link be-
tween economic heterogeneity and political asymmetry to fiscal asymmetry. Since direct tax 
withholding was impossible, regional governments applied alternative instruments of unilat-
eral devolution in order to establish complete control over their local economies. During the 
1990s regions often captured “their” local tax administrations (that were officially part of the 
Federal Tax Service), e.g. because of personal relations, absent federal financing and territo-
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rial rotation (Enikopolov, Zhuravskaya and Guriev, 2000). Moreover, about fifteen regions 
introduced monetary surrogates, which were used also to protect local enterprises from federal 
taxation (Genkin, 2000, Gaddy and Ickes, 2002). These informal institutional features, com-
bined with general accumulation of tax arrears in the economy, could make the strategic tax 
auditing an attractive solution for Russian regions.  
In fact, the role of political and institutional factors in accumulation of tax arrears was 
demonstrated by a number of empirical studies. The research of Treisman (2003) covers the 
period of 1994-1997 and is mostly based on region-level data. According to his results, re-
gions with larger enterprises tend to have higher tax arrears, the election of a Communist gov-
ernor is positively correlated with tax debt, and territories in which the share of regional gov-
ernment increased most in the previous year had lower growth of tax arrears. Ponomareva and 
Zhuravskaya (2004) apply a micro-level approach based on individual data on tax arrears of 
about one thousand firms in 1997 and 1998 and find higher federal tax arrears (controlling for 
liquidity) for regions with a stronger bargaining position against the centre, with higher sup-
port of governors in the last elections and with higher tensions in relations between governors 
and the centre. Treisman (1999) also presents a study of 42 enterprises in 1994-1997 and finds 
that in regions with a lower share of the federation in total tax revenue in the previous year 
companies pay higher taxes as share of reported pre-tax income. Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhu-
ravskaya (2005) study a set of Russian regions in 1996-2000 and argue that state capture is 
associated with an increase of federal tax arrears, but does not have any significant influence 
on regional tax arrears. Finally, Yakovlev (2006) presents some anecdotal evidence of tax au-
diting as tool in horizontal tax competition and Plekhanov (2006) shows for a sample of 79 
regions in 1998-1999 that protecting enterprises from taxation seemed to be an important in-
strument to attract mobile capital. 
While centralized federal structure and economic and political asymmetry created de-
mand for strategic tax collection policies, the third “ingredient”  simplifying the use of strate-
gic tax management in form of accumulating tax arrears has been increasing tax evasion in the 
Russian economy in the first ten years of transition as a result of liquidity deficit and mutual 
arrears networks of the early 1990s, of low tax morale and of a legitimacy deficit of the state 
as well as inefficient enforcement (see e.g. Varese, 1997; Yakovlev, 1999; Polterovich, 2001 
or Wintrobe, 2001). In 2002-2003 the share of the shadow economy accounted for 48.7% of 
Russian GDP (Schneider, 2005). A detailed discussion of the reasons for tax evasion is be-
yond the scope of this paper though it is important to notice, that this environment enlarges 
the options for strategically manipulating tax collection. 
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However, the ability of regions to manipulate tax arrears went down under the new 
administration of Vladimir Putin. One of the first acts of the new president was to regain con-
trol over the federal political structures in regions (what was called “strengthening the vertical 
of power”): in 2000 seven new federal districts were established, where presidential represen-
tatives (mostly with a background in the military or security service) obtained the right to 
oversee the selection and placement of personnel in local branches of federal authorities 
(Ross, 2003). Furthermore, regional governors lost a significant part of their influence be-
cause of institutional changes (like the reform of the upper chamber of the Russian parlia-
ment, the Federal Council, or the right of the president to remove a governor from his office; 
see Hyde, 2001) accompanied by a strong public support for the new president. After 2000, a 
consolidation of government (with increasing pressure of tax authorities and state-loyal deci-
sions of courts), internationalisation of Russian businesses requiring an increase in transpa-
rency (Yakovlev, 2005) and advancements in tax reform (Jones, Luong and Weinthal, 2004) 
seem to have made evasion less attractive. Moreover, the tax burden was weakened by the 
introduction of the flat tax on personal income. Although empirical studies on its effect are 
inconclusive (Ivanova, Keen and Klemm, 2005), it appears that it mainly affected tax revenue 
because it has facilitated tax collection and thus reduced the extent of tax evasion. After a 
permanent increase of tax arrears as a share of GDP or household tax revenue, this indicator 













1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 
Tax arrears / GDP  Tax arrears / Tax revenue of consolidated budget
 
Figure 2: Tax arrears in the Russian Federation (as of December 31 of respective year) 
Source: Goskomstat 
All these factors seem to reduce the willingness and the ability to manipulate taxation 
in favour of the regions. Nevertheless, even in 2003-2004, tax evasion exceeded 40% of taxes 
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paid when considering the so-called “spacemen schemes” (which include the creation of a 
short-life firm) of an average firm only (Mironov, 2006). Meanwhile the degree of asymmetry 
between regions in tax distribution remained significant: Magadan was able to get about 98% 
in 2003 of the whole tax revenue and may be compared with the most “secessionist” republics 
of the early 1990s. Indeed, the standard deviation of shares of tax collection de-facto attrib-
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Figure 3: Standard deviation of the region’s share in the tax revenue from its territory  
Sources: Goskomstat, Ministry of Finance, Federal Tax Service, Federal Treasury; Freink-
man, Treisman and Titov (1999) 
Hence, under Putin all three elements of the “strategic tax collection environment” (heteroge-
neity of regions, centralized federation and tax avoidance) still exist or become even more 
pronounced. There are, however, obvious changes in the bargaining power of the federation 
and regions. One could thus expect that the strategic tax collection behaviour changes. The 
next section presents some simple theoretical considerations, which could be useful to derive 
the main hypotheses for empirical research. 
 
3. Theoretical framework and main hypotheses 
  In order to formulate the empirical hypotheses we consider a simple principal-agent 
framework, where local tax authority (agent) acts on behalf of two principals: the federal gov-
ernment and the local government (as both gain from tax collection). The results of the 
agent’s activity depend upon his effort and the environmental characteristics. Agent’s utility 
is derived from potential benefits provided by the principals (e.g. direct (formal and informal 
payments), non-monetary benefits, career advancements etc.). Obviously, negative benefits 
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(punishments) are possible. On the other hand, agent’s activity is constrained by his resources, 
which could be used for tax collecting effort. This assumption is plausible given the high tax 
avoidance in Russia, which indicates, that tax service (given its resources) is unable to collect 
the total taxes due anyway. We assume that the resources for tax collection are exogenous. 
Moreover, the agent can choose between allocating effort in collection of “federal” or “re-
gional” taxes (or taxes with a higher share of the federal government or the regional govern-
ment). However, this allocation decision is only partly observable (but still observable to a 
certain extend) by the principals, whose monitoring capacity is unequal. Hence, the principals 
cannot completely distinguish between the results of the agent’s activity caused by environ-
mental characteristics or by allocation of his effort. Each principal maximises his own tax 
revenue regardless of the revenue of the other principal. The agent’s benefit depends upon the 
principal’s assessment of the agent’s effort for collecting taxes attributed to this principal re-
gardless of total tax collecting effort. 
  In a decentralized environment, like that of the development of Russian federalism 
under Yeltsin, the regional government has a double advantage over the federation: first, it 
has better instruments to observe both effort and environmental conditions and, second, it has 
a relative advantage in bargaining power (which has been extensively discussed in the previ-
ous section). Hence, the benefits from the regional government are higher, than those pro-
vided by the federal government (and the potential punishments also exceed those of the fed-
eration). First, regional government can effectively “protect” the agent from potential federal 
punishment and second, its resources for punishment and benefits for the agent exceed those 
of the federation. Moreover, the agent’s ability to “cheat” of the agent is higher with respect 
to the federation, than with respect to the region. Then it is more likely that the agent directs 
his effort in a way to better satisfy the requirements of the local principal than of the federal 
one. Assume further, that different agents in different regions face different tax collection 
constraints (because of the economic heterogeneity of regions); however, the federal centre is 
“equally weak” vis-à-vis different regions.  
  Since the tax revenue potentially originating from the tax base generated by the econ-
omy is not fully collected by the tax authorities, enterprises form tax arrears (both formally 
claimed by the tax collection service and successfully “hidden” from the state). Then, strate-
gic tax collection influences the distribution of tax arrears: tax arrears are larger for taxes, 
which are less thoroughly collected (given similar tax bases). From this point of view one can 
claim, that under conditions described above tax arrears for regional taxes are smaller, than 
those for federal taxes. If the tax arrears accumulate on costs of the federal taxes, the ratio of 
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federal taxes to total tax collection goes down (since both the numerator and the denominator 
are equally affected), resulting in effective fiscal decentralisation (as defined above). Other 
things being equal, regions with higher tax arrears should therefore achieve higher fiscal de-
centralisation, leading to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: In the 1990s (under Yeltsin’s presidency) regions with higher 
tax arrears are more likely to exhibit ceteris paribus higher fiscal decentrali-
sation in terms of tax revenue attributed to the federal centre.  
Obviously, bargaining power of the federal centre also varies differently in different centre-
region relations. Hence, for the aims of empirical analysis one has to control for potential po-
litical variables influencing the ability and the willingness of the regions to bargain with the 
federation in order to establish the ceteris paribus condition. 
The reform of Russian federalism under Putin (including changing institutional design 
of the federation and changes of informal rules of the game in the federal relations) shifts the 
bargaining power balance to the federation and increases its monitoring abilities. Hence, the 
incentives for the agent are reversed: it can derive higher utility (from benefits and avoiding 
punishments) from directing tax collection effort into federal taxes. Note, that there are no 
changes of agent’s or principals’ utility functions in this setting: we assume only changes of 
monitoring capacity and bargaining power. The shifts of strategic tax collection behaviour 
result from the actions of the agent, facing constraints of limited ability to collect taxes in 
general, while the principal’s action has only an indirect impact (from bargaining over “pro-
tecting” the agent from the punishment by another principal). Hence, we claim, that an impor-
tant factor for the manipulation of tax arrears under Putin can be the initiative of regional tax 
authorities seeking promotion and demonstrating their loyalty.  
Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence with respect to personnel changes in the 
regional tax authorities. However, there is some anecdotal evidence from other regional 
branches of federal law enforcing agencies, that the federal government started an active per-
sonnel restructuring since 2001 in order to ensure higher loyalty of regional authorities to the 
federation and to break the informal connections between local governments and local 
branches of federal agencies. For example, in 2001 the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(which is also responsible for the police in Russia) changed the heads of its regional branches 
in 7 regions; in 2002 it were 13 regions, in 2003 25 regions and in 2004 22 regions. Most suc-
cessors of the heads of regional police offices were not appointed from the regional staff, like 
it used to be the case in the 1990s; mostly they came from other regions or from the federal 
bodies of the Ministry (Voronov, 2005). It is likely, that other local branches of federal minis-
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tries expected similar changes (which were only partly reported by the press). But even if 
there were no direct changes in the tax collection service since 2000, the very experience of 
other ministries and services could have a strong impact on the behaviour of regional authori-
ties. The logic is exactly reverse to Hypothesis 1: tax arrears are mostly accumulated on costs 
of regional governments; in the ratio of federal tax revenue to total tax revenue the increase of 
tax arrears does affect the denominator much stronger, than the numerator, and the associated 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: In the 2000s (under Putin’s presidency) regions with higher 
tax arrears are more likely to exhibit ceteris paribus lower fiscal decentrali-
sation in terms of tax revenue attributed to the federal centre. 
  However, the principal-agent framework presented above does not provide any argu-
ments regarding strategic tax collection under increasing centralisation, typical for Putin’s 
presidency. On the contrary, since the influence of regional authorities went down, there seem 
to be no reasons for continuing strategic tax collection; the federal government, regaining 
control over regional tax authorities, could implement its aims through formal legislation (and 
indeed, the tax reforms since 2000 partly aimed to increase the share of tax collection attrib-
uted to the federal government). An alternative point of view is offered by the discussion of 
the semi-authoritarian regime in Russia, mostly originating from political sciences. The main 
idea of the approach is to differentiate between the “classical” authoritarianism, where the 
central government is able to enforce its objectives vis-à-vis other political groups through 
direct pressure, and the “hybrid regime”, or “semi-authoritarianism”, where the central gov-
ernment enforces its aims through indirect or hidden channels, imitating the “formal” democ-
ratic framework of developed countries (Olcott and Ottaway, 1999; Levitsky and Way, 2002; 
Furman, 2007). Technically, one assumes the additional constraints for the federation to 
change the institutional environment in its favour (similar to the typical way to model behav-
iour of non-democratic regimes presented e.g. in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) – “revolu-
tionary constraint”, or Wintrobe (1990) – minimal value of power function for the tinpot).  
This “imitation” results from a variety of reasons. First, unlike “classical” authoritar-
ian regimes, semi-authoritarian governments have a vested interest in the integration in the 
international community and hence, in complying with the rules of democratic societies (at 
least formally). Second, it can follow from a relatively weak power concentration (as com-
pared to the “classical” authoritarianism”), which makes the use of “indirect channels of con-
trol” inevitable. Anyway, formal redistribution of tax revenue between the centre and the re-
gions could be politically undesirable after certain thresholds are passed; so, the federal centre 
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may also be interested in strategic tax auditing as a “hidden” instrument to ensure the re-cen-
tralisation goals while formally complying with the “rules of conduct” established for democ-
ratic federations in the international community. Hence, the semi-authoritarian approach also 
provides some background for Hypothesis 2. 
 
4. Methodology and data 
  Due to the formulation of the hypotheses, and also because of limited ability to ob-
serve tax collection effort, we focus on tax arrears. An advantage of the Russian dataset is that 
there are data available on tax arrears for most of the regions and at least from 1995 onwards 
as reported by the federal statistical authority. We estimate the influence of tax arrears (as in-
dependent variable and proxy for tax collection effort) on distribution of tax revenue between 
the centre and the region, controlling for alternative factors. From Hypotheses 1 and 2 we ex-
pect a positive sign of tax arrears in the regressions with fiscal decentralisation as dependent 
variable in the Yeltsin’s period and a negative sign in the Putin period. 
The indicator of tax arrears used in this paper is reported on a regular basis by the 
Russian statistical authority (Goskomstat) and includes (1) tax obligations, which are claimed 
by the tax authorities, but were not paid by the taxpayer (nedoimka), (2) restructured tax lia-
bilities (e.g. when the payment of taxes was officially delayed), (3) tax liabilities not collected 
in due time because of the bankruptcy of the taxpayer, (4) tax liabilities, currently under coll-
ection by the court executives (bailiffs) and (5) liabilities from stopped tax collection activi-
ties. This measure has certain advantages and disadvantages. It is not an indicator of the sha-
dow economy and therefore does not measure the overall economic activity, which is “igno-
red” (consciously or not) by the tax authorities. It can also be influenced by events like bank-
ruptcy of large taxpayers or “wrong” claims of tax authorities, which could be later suspended 
by the court. But even in the last case it is a good proxy for the activity of tax authorities to 
collect taxes they claim from a tax base they know about. Therefore, it clearly separates from 
cases of lack of information, when tax authority is objectively unaware of a potential tax base. 
Hence, it rather accounts for strategic tax collection than for tax auditing.  
We include a variety of control variable accounting for economic differences among 
the regions. By including controls we, first, capture other factors leading to asymmetries be-
tween regions in the tax split between the regional and the federal budget. Mostly, they cover 
economic asymmetries or differences in tax base endowments. Their major effect is that they 
influence the ability of regions to collect different types of taxes. Under equal rules for distri-
bution of tax revenue from a region, great disproportions in the structure of tax revenue effec-
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tively allow regional governments to have a different share in the tax revenue of their terri-
tory. Mostly we take variables, which are the most similar to the tax bases as set in legislation. 
We try to control for income tax (average income per capita), corporate property tax (value of 
tangible assets), profit tax (net profits of all enterprises), sales tax (retail trade revenue) and 
taxes and payments from natural resources (share of oil and gas extracted in the region to total 
extraction of oil and gas in the Russian Federation).  
Another group of controls represents formal factors leading to differences in tax shar-
ing. From this point of view we include a dummy for Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. As men-
tioned above, these two regions were the first to enter the direct bilateral bargaining with the 
federal centre in the early 1990s and to sign separate power-sharing agreements, which al-
lowed these republics to receive all excises and rental payments for the natural resources in-
stead of federal centre. Therefore it is reasonable to assume, that these two regions have a sig-
nificantly different share of taxes attributed to their budgets. 
Finally, we include control variables representing political bargaining power and pref-
erences of the regional elite vis-à-vis the federal centre. Naturally, these factors are partly cap-
tured by the tax arrears structure. It has also been demonstrated by previous empirical studies 
cited above, that political bargaining power plays a role. However, even if the only direct 
channel of influencing the distribution of tax revenue for the regions others than Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan are not available, they still have an opportunity to bargain with the federal cen-
tre in order to set taxes split in a particular way, which favours particular jurisdictions given 
their endowment with the tax base. Therefore bargaining over the policy regarding the whole 
federation becomes an instrument of selective support of different regions. There is at least 
anecdotal evidence that strategically acting governments influence the federal decisions on the 
distribution of overall taxes (for the whole Russian Federation) to their advantage (see e.g. 
Petkov and Shklyar, 1999). On the other hand, preferences account for a desire of regional 
elites to invest more heavily in the bargaining process. From this point of view we estimate all 
regressions with and without political variables, in order to check the stability of results 
(however, only regressions with political variables are reported).  
Political variables, generally speaking, include two main groups: differences in bar-
gaining power and in political preferences. The following bargaining factors are considered: 
1. Economic potential of the region: territory, population, average income per capita 
and share of oil and gas extraction in the region (due to importance of these resources for 
Russia). The variables of economic potential represent both political bargaining power and 
differences in tax structure and therefore have a double role in the inference of our results. 
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2. Formal status of the region. The formal structure of the federation was inherited 
from Soviet times and, unlike the absolute majority of federations with a unified regional unit, 
includes territorial units of three major types: republics, administrative units (oblast, federal 
city or krai
1) and autonomous okrugs. National republics are often argued to enjoy special 
privileges as compared to other units of the federation (Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999); that is 
why we include a dummy for republics in our regressions.  
3. The ability of the region to secede (which is higher for border regions, for regions 
with higher distance from the capital and for regions with lower share of ethnically Russian 
Federation). We include two variables to capture this effect: a dummy for border regions and 
the geographical distance between regional capitals and Moscow. 
4. Over- (or under-)representation of the region in the Russian parliament. Since 1993 
the Russian parliament consists of two chambers: the Council of Federation, which includes 
one representative of the region’s legislature and one representative of the region’s governor 
administration
2, and the State Duma, which consists of 450 deputies, 225 elected by a system 
of proportional representation and 225 elected in single member districts. Under significant 
disproportions among Russian regions it could be expected, that the mal-apportionment 
should be huge in the Council
3, but also the composition of State Duma districts could be dif-
ferent from the structure of population (for influence of mal-apportionment on political deci-
sions see Samuels and Snyder, 2001). 
5. Power concentration within the office of the regional governor or president and con-
flict potential with the centre. The most common way to measure the power is to discuss the 
electoral statistics (share of governor in the latest elections or years in office). The conflict 
potential with the centre is often measured by the partisan status of the governor (e.g. Com-
munist governors in the 1990s or support of pro-presidential parties Our House Russia, Unity 
and Unified Russia in the elections of 1995, 1999 and 2003). Other indicators and expert opi-
nion could be applied. They all are questionable to a certain extent: in Russia cheating and ad-
ministrative manipulation of elections make their results less meaningful for analysis. The 
                                                           
1   Yevreiskaia autonomous oblast has similar status, although formally belongs to national units of the Federa-
tion. 
2   The way of composition of the Council of Federation changed twice: the first Council in 1993 was elected by 
popular vote (the Senate model), since 1995 the Council included all regional governors and all presidents of 
regional legislatures, and since 2002 it includes one representative appointed by the regional governor and 
one representative elected by the regional legislature. According to some estimates, inhabitants of Moscow 
formed the absolute majority of the first and the third Council.  
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Communist governors used to establish excellent contacts with the centre after their elections 
and expert opinion is always subjective. Nevertheless, in this paper we reduce the variety of 
possible indicators to the power index of Jarocinska (2004), partly including other indicators 
discussed above.  
6. Dependence upon federal transfers. The issue of transfers is interesting, as it repre-
sents a trade-off for the regions: to pay more taxes and (probably) to receive higher compen-
sation in form of transfers or to pay little taxes and loose a claim for financial support from 
the centre. In a real world setting with asymmetric information it is possible that a region uses 
both strategies or switches from one strategy to another. Regions with a relatively high bar-
gaining power can succeed in both strategies. We include the share of fiscal transfers in total 
expenditures of regional governments to account for this effect. Obviously, the timing of 
events should represent an important feature from this point of view: if transfers are distrib-
uted before tax collection effort is made, there should be no effect on tax collection. However, 
from the empirical point of view this issue seems to be relatively intransparent. Governments 
collect taxes throughout the year (partly on quarterly basis), and hence, there is no clear “tim-
ing” vis-à-vis transfer decision. Moreover, the relations between regional and federal govern-
ments could be analysed as a repeated game, where expectations should play an important 
role. 
The simplest way to measure the heterogeneity in political preferences is to consider 
the ethnic composition of a region (share of non-Russian population), as well as other socio-
demographic indicators. In this study we included the urbanisation indicator, which proved to 
be significant in other empirical papers on endogenous centralisation.
4 Moreover, there are 
significant differences in the democratisation level in different regions of Russia, which also 
account for heterogeneity of preferences (but also for peculiarities of regional political proc-
ess). We use the Carnegie Endowment index of democratisation, which covers all regions in 
our analysis, as well as varies over time. Some bargaining indicators (like average income per 
capita) also may be considered as a proxy for heterogeneous preferences. A detailed descrip-
tion of all variables and the summary statistics are provided in Appendix A. 
As mentioned above, economic and political asymmetry of the Russian federalism and 
the transition from Yeltsin to Putin during the period of observation create a series of econo-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3   For Council of Federation representatives of subordinate jurisdictions entitled to own representation in the 
parliament (like autonomous okrugs) are counted together with other representatives of this jurisdiction. This 
assumption is simplified and does not reflect the multitude of conflicts between regional administrations.  
4   Although this indicator may also represent a higher bargaining power of metropolitan arrears. 
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metric problems. Therefore we use a four-stage research strategy. First, in order to get a gen-
eral “impression” on the specifics of the data, we estimate individual annual cross section re-
gressions by OLS. An advantage of the Russian Federation as a case study of the evolution of 
federalism is that the high number of regions (until 2005 the Russian Federation included 88 
regions) renders this approach statistically feasible. As dependent variable we use the share of 
the regional government from total tax revenue of the respective year. As indicator of stra-
tegic tax collection and auditing we apply tax arrears per unit of gross regional product.
5 In 
order to deal with outliers, this indicator is squared. Already at this stage, as well as in case of 
panel data regressions, we perform a simple outlier control as an additional robustness analy-
sis to achieve the normal distribution of residuals in order to make correct inference in a small 
sample. 
Second, we address the problem of unobserved heterogeneity (both region-specific 
and time-specific) and run panel-data regressions. We estimate both pooled cross-sections and 
one way and two way fixed effects regressions (time and cross-section). Regional fixed ef-
fects are helpful, as they account for all possible forms of uncovered heterogeneity among re-
gions, which seems to be very strong given extremely asymmetric spatial structure of the 
Russian economy and political structure of the Russian federalism; pooled cross-sections and 
one way time series fixed effects allow the direct inclusion of institutional variables (which 
often do not vary over time) in our research. Pooled OLS includes a dummy for all years 
when Vladimir Putin was in office, so that one can directly observe the changes through tran-
sition of power. In order to account for both hypotheses, the reported pooled data regressions 
include two tax arrears indicators: under Yeltsin and under Putin. Both are equal to tax arrears 
per unit of GRP for the periods of administration of respective president and zero otherwise.  
Third, we address the potential endogeneity bias due to the reverse causality problem 
(fiscal decentralisation is likely to influence tax collection behaviour). There are theoretical 
reasons, which make reverse causality questionable. Nevertheless, we estimate TSLS panel 
data regressions (once again, pooled data, one way and two way fixed effects) and lagged re-
gressions in order to deal with this problem.  
Fourth, as mentioned above, the asymmetric character of Russian federalism is likely 
to cause problems of outliers. The previous steps already included outlier control based on 
normality of residuals. In the fourth stage, however, we explicitly address this issue by both 
                                                           
5   A certain disadvantage of this proxy for tax collection effort is that we had to exclude nine regions of the 
Russian Federation (the so-called “autonomous okrugs”, which are officially both members of the federation 
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estimating OLS and FE after elimination of observations with very large values of tax arrears 
and estimating least absolute deviation (median) regressions with bootstrapped standard er-
rors, which are known to be more robust to samples with significant outliers. 
Our analysis covers the period of 9 years (1995-2003), which includes practically the 
whole history of the Russian federalism – from the period of “regional feudalism” in the mid 
1990s to the current “vertical of power” under president Putin. The analysis covers all regions 
of the Russian Federation excluding nine autonomous okrugs
6 and the Chechen Republic, 
where no reliable data are present. In order to form separate variables for the Yeltsin and 
Putin tax arrears (as considered above) and the dummy for the Putin’s presidency we count 
the year 2000 as the first year when Putin has already been in office. Indeed, Putin became 
acting president on 31 December 1999. The first shift in the structure of federalism was in 
May 2000, as the president appointed his representatives to the newly established “federal dis-
tricts” in order to control local governors. Moreover, the year 2000 was associated with a 
rapid change of informal rules of the game; combined with expectations of further centralisa-
tion by regional officials, one could expect the changes in strategic tax collection behaviour 
already in 2000. On the other hand, since the rise of Putin to power was extremely quick and 
completely unexpected for both population and local elites (in fact, in 1999 most influential 
governors counted on the alternative candidate, former prime minister Yevgeniy Primakov), 
one should not expect any changes in tax collection due to shifts in expectations in 1999, and 
hence, it is reasonable to attribute this year to the “Yeltsin period”. 
  
5. Results  
5.1. Annual cross-sections 
As mentioned above, we start with individual cross-section regressions for the years 
1995-2003 (Table 1). The Jarque-Bera test for all regressions (with the exception of 2003) is 
significant, such that the hypothesis of normal distribution of residuals must be rejected. This 
requires us to test on the robustness of the regression results to outliers. The results generally 
do not change after this procedure, except for some (mostly marginally significant) variables. 
Robust regressions and lists of outliers are reported in Appendix B. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and parts of other larger regions), where GRP data are available only until 2000, for the aims of consistency 
of annual cross-sections. 
6   One autonomous okrug (Chukotka) is not part of another member of the Federation; therefore Goskomstat 
provides statistical data for this region in full scale, and it could be included in our research. 
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The results reported in Table 1 are partly consistent with our expectations: we find that 
the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have a significantly lower share of taxes attrib-
uted to the centre than the rest of the members of the Federation until 2000 (when the cen-
tralisation effort of Vladimir Putin started). Other results are however less robust throughout 
the history of the Russian Federation. For the early 2000s, we find a significant positive influ-
ence of the share of fiscal transfers, of urbanisation and the share of Russians in the region on 
the proportion of taxes received by the region. The first result is very interesting from the per-
spective of an interaction between bargaining power and interests for tax revenue and trans-
fers. Some regions seem to be able to receive both: a higher share of tax revenue and higher 
fiscal transfers.  
We do not find any significant impact of the tax manipulation in the Russian Federa-
tion until 2000. Since 2000 we find strongly significant evidence of influence of tax arrears on 
the distribution of taxes, and the sign of the coefficient is negative. These results are robust to 
the exclusion of outliers. On the basis of cross section regressions, we do thus not find evi-
dence, that regions manipulate tax arrears in their favour. On the contrary, regional tax au-
thorities, subordinated to the federal centre, manipulated tax arrears to the advantage of the 
federation in the early 2000s. The annual cross section analysis therefore does not confirm 
Hypothesis 1, though it confirms Hypothesis 2. 
The set of outliers changes from year to year and allows some interesting conclusions 
(Appendix B, Table B1). The number of outliers increased in the late 1990s-early 2000 and 
then went down again. This indicates an unstable situation in the Russian Federation in the 
“transition period” from Yeltsin to Putin, when regions partly carried out “atypical” economic 
policies, which cannot be captured by our modelling. Most outliers did not fit the general pat-
tern for the Russian Federation exactly in the years, when these regions were more active in 
carrying out the “tax haven strategy” (Ingushetia in the early 1990s, Mordovia in the early 
2000s), i.e. used legal possibilities provided by the presidential decrees or loopholes in the 
legislation to create a more favourable tax regime for companies incorporated in this jurisdic-
tions (partly only for specific large taxpayers associated with influential multiregional busi-
ness groups or privileged companies owned by the representatives of the regional elite). Un-
fortunately, absence of transparent and consequent information makes an ex ante control for 
this strategy in empirical research practically impossible. 
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Table 1: Regressions for individual annual cross-sections, 1995-2003, dependent variable: share of tax 
revenue attributed to regional government 
Variable  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Tax structure            
0.246 0.131 0.025 0.062  0.113*  0.085 0.043 -0.011 0.002  Average income 
per capita  (0.154) (0.107) (0.093) (0.069) (0.064)  (0.054) (0.034) (0.023) (0.022) 
0.690*  0.346 0.117 0.211 0.193 -0.409 -0.033 -0.316 -0.490  Oil & gas share 
(0.382)  (0.231) (0.308) (0.295) (0.295) (0.511) (0.536) (0.821) (0.642) 
-0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  Retail trade 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.003  -0.017** -0.010**  0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002  Net profit 
(0.009)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
-1.971*  -0.279 0.069 -0.597 -0.528 -0.044 -0.111 -0.068 0.015  Capital funds 
(1.093)  (0.303) (0.448) (0.430) (0.320) (0.250) (0.179) (0.204) (0.177) 
Legal factors            
0.208***  0.289*** 0.131* 0.287***  0.342***  0.203**  0.027 -0.091 -0.054  Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan  (0.069) (0.078) (0.073) (0.069) (0.076) (0.100) (0.113) (0.078) (0.064) 
-3.562 0.073 -0.581 -0.850 -1.969  -1.993*** -1.054** -0.174***  -0.258***  Tax arrears 
squared  (4.68)  (2.188) (1.896) (1.580) (2.080) (0.608) (0.443) (0.059) (0.058) 
Political variables           
0.071***  0.013 0.031 0.030 0.025 -0.010 0.016 0.043 0.027  Territory 
(0.025)  (0.028) (0.037) (0.033) (0.042) (0.051) (0.031) (0.027) (0.033) 
0.051*  0.023 -0.003 0.024 0.043*  0.005 0.029 0.021 0.023  Population 
(0.029)  (0.020) (0.027) (0.031) (0.025)  (0.024) (0.0244)  (0.03)  (0.035) 
0.006 0.007 0.023 0.032 0.016 0.036 0.015 0.032 0.018  Dummy border 
region  (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031) 
0.009 0.005 0.002 0.005 -0.007 0.001 0.007 0.009 0.012*  Distance from 
Moscow  (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)  (0.0070) 
0.092*  0.070 0.073 0.018 0.066 0.050 0.152 0.141 0.086  Dummy republic 
(0.048)  (0.053) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053) (0.088) (0.097) (0.094) (0.066) 
-0.009 0.006 0.029 -0.007 -0.008 -0.027 -0.004 -0.006 -0.015  Overrepresentation 
in Federal Council   (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.034) (0.025) (0.028) (0.024) 
-0.012 -0.012 -0.070 0.011  0.018 0.056 -0.025 0.001 0.017  Overrepresentation 
in State Duma  (0.046) (0.051) (0.056) (0.059) (0.062) (0.080) (0.060) (0.065) (0.063) 
-0.017 -0.013 -0.017 0.005 -0.013 -0.015 -0.003 0.004  0.001  Power (Jarocinska) 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) 
0.213 -0.042 -0.119 -0.025 0.196  0.165 0.2940*  0.255  0.342**  Fiscal transfers 
(0.192) (0.159) (0.149) (0.113) (0.134) (0.128) (0.151)  (0.153)  (0.168) 
0.162 0.168 0.183 -0.001  0.257*  0.135 0.286  0.263* 0.285**  Share of Russians 
(0.154) (0.160) (0.149) (0.123) (0.139)  (0.167) (0.172) (0.132) (0.108) 
0.001  0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002  -0.0022 -0.003  -0.002  -0.002  Democratisation 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
0.028 0.441 2.383 1.872 2.934 1.970  3.115* 3.435*  2.514  Urbanisation 
(0.998) (1.103) (1.679) (2.281) (2.283) (2.351) (1.684) (1.859) (1.880) 
0.479 0.417 0.520 0.529 0.187 0.313 -0.049 0.017 0.088  Constant 
(0.254) (0.250) (0.203)  (0.18)  (0.214) (0.220) (0.268) (0.286) (0.280) 
R
2 0.540 0.439 0.364 0.434 0.504 0.405 0.433 0.434 0.522 
F-test  14.9*** 14.6*** 17.3***  131.1***  121.8***  21.9*** 41.4***  726.4***  32.6*** 
No.  obs.  79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Jarque-Bera  486.4***  396.1***  22.51*** 6.735**  8.673** 17.56***  80.79***  38.31***  3.419 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are robust Huber/White standard errors; *** significant at 1% level; ** signifi-
cant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Significant results are marked bold. 
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5.2. Panel data 
  The results of the panel data analysis (Table 2) corroborate the results of annual cross-
sections. The pooled cross-sections (both with and without year dummies) indicate a highly 
significant negative sign of tax arrears under Putin, which holds after the exclusion of outliers 
with large residuals (which is also necessary due to the results of the Jarque-Bera test) as Ta-
ble B2 in Appendix B demonstrates. Tax arrears for the Yeltsin period have the positive sign 
predicted by Hypothesis 1, but are, however, insignificant. Generally speaking, controlling for 
outliers with large residuals does not change these results; moreover, tax arrears for the Yel-
tsin period hold their sign after the exclusion of outliers and even become significant. In both 
one-way regional fixed effects and two-way fixed effects regressions both tax arrears vari-
ables have the sign predicted by our analysis, but are partly insignificant; after exclusion of 
outliers tax arrears for Yeltsin also become significant. 
  Further results partly follow the predicted pattern: higher bargaining potential and/or 
higher heterogeneity as compared to the Russian average lead to higher decentralisation. As 
expected, dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan has a positive sign and is significant in all 
specifications. The dummy republic is significant and has a positive sign in the majority of 
regressions, representing a higher bargaining power of republics and/or path dependence ef-
fects. Dummy border region is also almost always significant and positive, indicating higher 
bargaining power of potential secessionist territories (or relative underdevelopment of the re-
gion requiring special treatment). Territory is highly significant and positive, supporting the 
idea, that territory was used as a bargaining argument in Russia. Urbanisation is significant 
and positive, but its effect does not always hold after exclusion of outliers (probably because 
of the exclusion of Altai Republic, which has been identified as outlier in the majority of re-
gressions and has an extraordinarily low urbanisation ratio). 
However, we do not find any significant influence of the index of power on tax distri-
bution (the result is sensitive to the specification of the model because of multicollinearity 
problems, inevitable for an artificially constructed index). It is possible to interpret this result 
as indicating a very low transparency of tax relations between the Russian regions and the 
federation. A surprising result is, that regions with a higher share of Russian population were 
associated with a higher share of taxes remaining in the region (as already noted, this effect 
was probably achieved through the significance and the sign of the coefficient in the early 
2000s). To a certain extent it contradicts the common wisdom that the national republics were 
more secessionist and interested in decentralisation than Russian regions. Indeed, the dummy 
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republic already captured potential secessionist tensions. However, the result is still unex-
pected. 
There are several explanations for this. First, regions may be more interested in federal 
transfers than in taxes. It is true for both more powerful regions (which gain from redistribu-
tion on the federal level) and heterogeneous poor regions with large populations. Indeed, the 
model estimates a significant positive effect of fiscal transfers on tax distribution in favour of 
regions, but it does not hold after exclusion of outliers, so, the correct inference of the t-values 
is impossible. Second, the treatment of the city of Moscow with a relatively low share of tax 
revenue attributed to its government and excellent indicators may influence the regressions. 
However, Moscow is not an outlier (from the point of view of residuals), and so should not 
influence the robustness of regressions. Third, it is possible, that higher power and higher het-
erogeneity cause an opposite effect: the federal government is even more likely to put pres-
sure on these regions. For example, a possible interpretation of the results is that the centrali-
sation pressure from the centre in the early 2000s was higher for national, than for Russian 
regions (as the latter were perceived as a larger threat for the unity of Russia). The federal 
centre seems to be more active in suppressing wealthy regions than poor territories still de-
pending on tax transfers. This policy could include both specific measures for individual terri-
tories, but also a general design of the tax system. The dummy for the Putin’s office period is 
highly significant and negative for all models: it shows once again the centralisation trend in 
Russian federalism under the current president. The tax structure variables were mostly insig-
nificant, thus supporting the extremely high importance of political factors for tax assignment, 
which seems to be present in the 2000s.  
In order to check the robustness of the results we exclude all political variables (given 
their relatively “vague” nature, causing the threat of measurement errors) and control the re-
stricted regressions for the normality of residuals. Generally, this analysis does not change our 
results. The dummy for Tatarstan and Bashkortostan has a positive and significant coefficient 
in all regressions until 2000, and tax arrears have a negative significant and robust coefficient 
from 2000. In 2003 this dummy becomes even significantly negative, probably supporting our 
logic of “oppressing” of potentially separatist regions (already discussed in the previous sec-
tion). The results of panel data regressions also did not change. Coefficients for both tax ar-
rears variables also remain significant in basic regression and hold their sign after controlling 
for outliers. In the one way regional fixed effect regression the coefficients for tax arrears are 
(as previously) insignificant, but still hold the (predicted) sign. In the two way FE specifica-
tion tax arrears under Putin even become significant. 
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Tax structure        
-0.007  0.010*  0.002 0.003  Average income per 
capita  (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.008) (0.009) 
0.033 4.605  0.001 6.416  Oil & gas share 
(0.037) (4.581)  (0.045) (4.901) 
-0.000 0.000  -0.000 0.000  Retail trade 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
0.001**  -0.000 0.000  0.000  Net profit 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
-0.085*** -0.071***  -0.061** -0.093***  Capital funds 
(0.024) (0.023)  (0.027) (0.022) 
Legal factors      
0.158*** -  0.159*** -  Dummy Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan  (0.044) -  (0.043) - 
Political variables        
0.047*** -  0.043*** -  Territory 
(0.011) -  (0.012) - 
-0.007  0.101***  -0.009  0.067**  Population 
(0.006)  (0.035)  (0.006)  (0.030) 
0.027*** -  0.027** -  Dummy border region 
(0.010) -  (0.011) - 
0.008*** -  0.008*** -  Distance from Moscow 
(0.002) -  (0.002) - 
0.077** -  0.076** -  Dummy republic 
(0.031) -  (0.031) - 
-0.006  -0.051***  -0.007  -0.046**  Overrepresentation in 
Federal Council   (0.009)  (0.019)  (0.009)  (0.018) 
0.005 0.046  0.005 0.036  Overrepresentation in 
State Duma  (0.022) (0.043)  (0.023) (0.042) 
-0.012 -  -0.012 -  Power (Jarocinska) 
(0.007) -  (0.008) - 
0.112*  0.085  0.120** 0.101**  Fiscal transfers 
(0.061)  (0.050)  (0.057) (0.049) 
0.177** -  0.177** -  Share of Russians 
(0.070) -  (0.070) - 
-0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.000  Democratisation 
(0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) 
2.456***  2.147  2.248***  -0.427  Urbanisation 
(0.78)  (5.858)  (0.768)  (5.832) 
Dummy Putin  -  -0.098*** -0.090***  - 
  -  (0.013) (0.018)  - 
0.260 0.355  0.438 0.064  Arrears (Yeltsin) 
(1.178) (0.666)  (1.043) (0.699) 
-0.252***  -0.060  -0.237***  -0.066  Arrears (Putin) 
(0.040)  (0.042)  (0.033)  (0.042) 
0.371  0.256 0.390  1.281  Constant 
(0.108)  (0.414) (0.108)  (0.673) 
Region fixed effects  No  Yes No  Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes  No No  Yes 
R
2 0.442 0.002 0.378 0.001 
F-test 27.16***  39.98***  25.42***  177.07*** 
No. obs.  711  711  711  711 
Jarque-Bera 340.7***  315***  261.9***  507.03*** 
 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are robust Newey/West standard errors for first-order autocorrelation; *** sig-
nificant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Coefficients for time and region fixed 
effects are not reported. For FE (region) estimator overall R
2 is reported. 
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5.3. Endogeneity problem and instrumental variables estimation 
The next problem potentially causing biased estimates in our research is endogeneity.  
It is not clear, whether the bargaining and economic power of the region depend upon the tax 
distribution or (as it is assumed by the empirical model) vice versa. Theoretically, there are 
some reasons to believe that this problem is less relevant for Russia. First, economic policies 
of Russian regions have been mostly inefficient, and their economic success is mostly limited 
to agglomeration effects or natural resources. Ahrend (2005) finds significant effects of fiscal 
policy on economic performance, which, however, vanishes in the TSLS regressions. There is 
some evidence from principal component analysis that fiscal policy can be important for re-
gional economic development reported by Mau and Yanovsky (2002). Second, since our pa-
per deals with asymmetric distribution of tax revenue and not with differences in overall tax 
revenue, even effective tax policy does not necessarily lead to biased results. There is no con-
sistent point of view in the theory on whether the federal centre or the regions carry out more 
efficient economic policies; and in Russia with its huge variety of individual models both 
variants could theoretically be present. Therefore it is difficult to establish a clear backward 
causal link between tax distribution and economic asymmetry. Nevertheless, Desai et al. 
(2005) show, that there is a positive relation between some specific indicators of economic 
performance of the regions and the retention of taxes.  
In order to control for potential endogeneity we use two procedures. First, we estimate 
all regressions with all lagged variables (where distribution of tax revenue in year t is ex-
plained by all variables of the year t-1). These estimations are also helpful, since the tax col-
lection of the current year is partly calculated on the basis of revenues of the past year, which 
can be captured by our additional analysis. The results for tax arrears are robust for all cross 
section regressions, with the exception of that for 2000 when tax arrears become insignificant. 
Moreover, the results of panel data regressions hold for all political and legal variables, but 
the impact of tax arrears changes. In the second specification both tax arrears are negative, but 
only the Yeltsin tax arrears are significant and stable. In the third specification both tax ar-
rears variables have a negative sign, but only the tax arrears under Putin are significant and 
robust. There are no changes in other specifications. 
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Tax  structure           
0.007  0.019**  -0.007 -0.001 0.011  0.018  0.015** 0.014**  Average income 
per capita  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.007) (0.014) (0.018)  (0.01) (0.006) (0.006) 
0.037 0.018 2.087 0.679 0.031 0.049  2.957  1.083  Oil & gas share 
(0.046) (0.053) (4.247) (5.245) (0.046) (0.044)  (5.190)  (4.537) 
- - - - - -  -  -  Retail trade 
- - - - - -  -  - 
- - - - - -  -  -  Net profit 
- - - - - -  -  - 
-0.056* -0.106***  -0.066***  -0.089**  -0.104***  -0.124*** -0.086*** -0.092***  Capital funds 
(0.031) (0.027) (0.015) (0.037) (0.038) (0.032)  (0.023)  (0.035) 
Legal factors            
0.238*** 0.127***  - -  0.077  0.133***  - -  Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan  (0.059) (0.047)  -  -  (0.067)  (0.042)  -  - 
Political variables            
0.053*** 0.035***  - -  0.019  0.032***  - -  Territory 
(0.014) (0.012)  - -  (0.030)  (0.013)  - - 
-0.015** -0.014** 0.133***  0.103 -0.009  -0.014*  0.047 0.049  Population 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.035) (0.073) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.040) (0.040) 
0.036*** 0.031**  - -  0.019  0.029**  - -  Dummy border 
region  (0.011) (0.012)  -  -  (0.024)  (0.012)  -  - 
0.006** 0.007***  - -  0.009*** 0.008***  - -  Distance from 
Moscow  (0.002) (0.003)  -  -  (0.003) (0.003)  -  - 
0.074*** 0.079***  - -  0.072*** 0.079***  - -  Dummy republic 
(0.025) (0.025)  - -  (0.026) (0.025)  - - 
-0.020*  -0.021  -0.039** -0.042*  -0.003 -0.024  -0.035  -0.036  Overrepresentation 
in Federal Council   (0.010) (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.011) (0.018)  (0.024) (0.03) 
0.032 0.029 0.064 0.070 -0.012 0.042 0.018 0.032  Overrepresentation 
in State Duma  (0.028) (0.040) (0.043) (0.051) (0.027) (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.065) 
- - - - - -  -  -  Power (Jarocin-
ska)  -  - - -  - -  -  - 
0.261*** 0.166***  -0.010 -0.004 -0.021  0.134*** 0.133**  0.099*  Fiscal transfers 
(0.073) (0.048) (0.063) (0.055) (0.131) (0.056) (0.061) (0.052) 
0.235*** 0.202***  - -  0.117  0.191***  - -  Share of Russians 
(0.056) (0.056)  - -  (0.094)  (0.056)  - - 
- - - - - -  -  -  Democratisation 
- - - - - -  -  - 
3.618***  0.535 7.083 8.954 -0.628 0.777  -2.544  4.247  Urbanisation 
(1.204)  (1.073) (12.788)  (10.984) (2.694)  (1.110) (8.737) (10.46) 
Dummy Putin  -  - - -  - -  -  - 
  -  - - -  - -  -  - 
-5.946  12.376* 5.471*  4.635  9.988** 9.706**  6.873 6.578  Arrears (Yeltsin) 
(6.909)  (6.509) (3.316) (4.342)  (4.823) (4.318)  (5.603) (7.500) 
1.200 -8.239 -0.265 -4.714 -2.284  -10.594**  0.050 -2.202  Arrears (Putin) 
(1.279)  (5.071)  (0.383) (10.983) (2.402)  (5.281)  (0.242) (8.858) 
0.007 0.331 -0.019  -0.100 0.516 0.312 0.722 0.283  Constant 
(0.139) (0.089) (0.848) (0.651) (0.271) (0.083)  (0.577)  (0.693) 
Region fixed ef-
fects  No No Yes Yes No No  Yes  Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes No No No No  Yes  Yes 
Kalmykia incl.  Yes No Yes No Yes No  Yes  No 
R
2 0.083 0.194 0.002 0.005 0.132 0.139  0.000  0.002 
F-test  16.00*** 21.76*** 18.66*** 18.80*** 16.95*** 19.64***  23.91***  22.51*** 
No.  obs.  711 702 711 702 711 702  711  702 
Hansen  J    2.490 2.207 0.008 0.059  8.338**  4.576  0.009  0.083 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are robust Huber/White standard errors; *** significant at 1% level; ** signifi-
cant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. For FE (region) estimator overall R
2 is reported. Instruments are 
retail trade, net profits, democratisation and power. 
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The second approach is based on the instrumental variables estimator. We use retail 
sales, net profits, democratisation and power as instruments for both tax arrears under Putin 
and under Yeltsin. Unfortunately the quality of instruments is much better for the last ones, 
than for the first ones. We estimate instrumental variables regressions using TSLS without 
time or cross section fixed effects, as well as with one way and two way fixed effects (Table 
3). In the first case, as well as in the one way regional FE specification both tax arrears vari-
ables still hold their sign predicted by the hypotheses (though in the first specification Hansen 
J test is significant, indicating a potential over-identification problem). However, unlike the 
previous results, we obtain significant estimates for the Yeltsin period and insignificant re-
sults for the Putin period. Hence, there are reasons to believe, that the latter could be driven 
by the endogeneity problem. The instrumental variables approach supports our first hypothe-
sis, while giving no evidence for the second one. In the two way fixed effects and the one way 
time FE both indicators of tax arrears are insignificant.  
 
5.4. Outliers and median regressions 
High heterogeneity and political asymmetry suggest, that outliers can have a signifi-
cant impact on the regression results. In particular, this outcome seems to be plausible for the 
Putin period, since the standard deviation of both fiscal decentralisation indicator (Figure 3 
above) and tax arrears (Figure 4) increased significantly. The latter trend can be attributed to 
increases of tax arrears in a small group of regions, especially in Kalmykia, where tax arrears 
exceeded the size of its GRP or were nearly equal to it. Kalmykia did not show up as outlier 
in the previous analysis based on large error terms; however, extreme size of the variable for 
this observation can still influence the outcomes of the analysis. 
Generally speaking, the situation in Kalmykia confirms the explanation presented 
above. During the 1990s this region functioned as a kind of “internal tax haven”: extremely 
loyal policies of the local tax authorities combined with the reduction of a region’s share in 
tax rates and privileged treatment of companies with the majority of operations outside the 
region made it attractive for a huge variety of firms, including several large oil giants, which 
used Kalmykia for their transfer pricing design. On the other hand, the region had one of the 
strongest authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet Russia, even compatible to that of post-Soviet 
Central Asian republics (see e.g. Gel’man, 1999). The government of the Republic dominated 
its economic structure. Kalmykia used to be not only one of the strongest, but also one of the 
most eccentric regimes, often directly opposing the federal government or declaring its region 
an “independent state” within the Russian Federation. That is why after Putin’s rise to power 
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Kalmykian president Iliumdzinov had to have more fears than his counterparts in other Rus-
sian regions. Kalmykia was also partly subject to business-government struggles of the mid-
2000s, associated with tax auditing of the largest Russian oil companies like Yukos or Sib-
neft, previously using the Kalmykian offshore. The problem of outliers requires careful 










1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Mean Median Std. Dev.
 
Figure 4: Statistics for tax arrears per unit of GRP 
Source: Goskomstat 
  As mentioned above, we use outlier-robust median regressions to check our results. 
We estimate all four specifications with the median regression (moreover, pooled cross-
sections are estimated with and without Putin dummy); in order to account for heteroscedas-
ticity and non-normality of residuals bootstrapped standard errors are used. The results are 
reported in Table 4. Generally, median regressions also confirm Hypothesis 1. The Putin tax 
arrears have the correct sign, but are insignificant. 
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Tax structure          
-0.012  -0.019*** -0.028***  -0.002 -0.002  Average income per 
capita (0.012)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.038 -4.186 0.013 0.003 -4.182  Oil & gas share 
(0.042) (6.889) (0.060) (0.081) (6.634) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  Retail trade 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  Net profit 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.060*  -0.022 -0.017 -0.038  -0.065**  Capital funds 
(0.034)  (0.035) (0.031) (0.046) (0.031) 
Legal factors       
0.164***  -  0.134*** 0.143***  -  Dummy Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan  (0.040)  -  (0.034) (0.034)  - 
Political variables       
0.029**  - 0.031  0.033***  -  Territory 
(0.016)  - (0.013)  (0.012)  - 
-0.007 0.059  -0.011**  -0.005 -0.005  Population 
(0.006) (0.050) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.037) 
0.0206***  -  0.019** 0.024***  -  Dummy border region 
(0.008)  -  (0.008) (0.009)  - 
0.008***  -  0.008*** 0.006***  -  Distance from Moscow 
(0.002)  -  (0.002) (0.002)  - 
0.067 -  0.052** 0.056***  -  Dummy republic 
(0.022) - (0.025) (0.022)  - 
0.001 0.028 0.011 0.007 -0.009  Overrepresentation in 
Federal Council   (0.009)  (0.037) (0.008) (0.009) (0.029) 
-0.004 -0.092 -0.024 -0.020 -0.057  Overrepresentation in 
State Duma  (0.022)  (0.063) (0.012) (0.020) (0.058) 
-0.004 - -0.008  -0.008 -  Power (Jarocinska) 
(0.007) - (0.007)  (0.007) - 
0.077*  0.003 -0.000 0.049 0.054  Fiscal transfers 
(0.040)  (0.055) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) 
0.167***  -  0.103* 0.125***  -  Share of Russians 
(0.042)  -  (0.055) (0.046)  - 
-0.001  -0.006***  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002  Democratisation 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
0.625 -1.259  0.917*  0.541 0.551  Urbanisation 
(0.495) (7.829) (0.501)  (0.459) (5.765) 
1.310  2.984*** 2.089***  1.392**  1.471**  Arrears (Yeltsin) 
(0.822)  (0.735) (0.482) (0.544) (0.675) 
-0.233 -0.030 -0.341 -0.242 -0.016  Arrears (Putin) 
(0.554) (0.720) (0.817) (0.584) (0.280) 
Dummy Putin  - - -  -0.075***  - 
  - - -  (0.016)  - 
0.495 0.777 0.566 0.547 0.664  Constant 
(0.074) (0.528) (0.086) (0.077) (0.404) 
Region fixed effects  No Yes No No Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes No No No Yes 
Pseudo R
2 0.313 0.438 0.232 0.258 0.556 
No.  obs.  711 711 711 711 711 
 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (bootstrapts n = 1000). *** significant at 1% level; ** signifi-
cant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.  
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Moreover, we estimate all specifications after exclusion of Kalmykia in order to see, 
whether the outliers drive our results (see also Appendix C). Table 5 summarizes the estima-
tions after exclusion of Kalmykia. Most estimation methods (OLS, TSLS and median) and 
most specifications yield significant and positive sign of the tax arrears under Yeltsin, as pre-
dicted by our hypothesis. This result is relatively robust even if it is not significant. The re-
sults of Putin tax arrears are (as expected) much less robust: nevertheless, in TSLS and most 
median regressions we obtain the predicted sign, although only in one case also significant 
results. 
Table 5: Sign and significance of the coefficient tax arrears on exclusion of Kalmykia    
Annual cross-sections  Panel data  Model 
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TSLS (see 
Table 3) 

















A Kalmykia and other outliers necessary to obtain non-significant Jarque-Bera test are excluded. For the 
basic specifications outliers are reported in Appendix B. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  The aim of this paper is to test, whether the strategic manipulations of tax arrears 
could be used in a principal-agent setting with a central government, that does not have suffi-
cient information and monitoring capacities of the regional influence on tax collection, and 
regions, which are able to focus their tax auditing and collection effort on taxes mostly bene-
fiting their budgets. Moreover, we have tested, whether federations in semi-authoritarian re-
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gimes have an incentive to manipulate tax collection in their favour. In order to conduct these 
tests, we analyse the case of the Russian Federation.  
  Generally speaking, our results partly confirm the intuition behind this paper: there is 
evidence that tax arrears are used strategically to manipulate distribution of taxes between the 
federation and the regions. Our four-stage estimation strategy, however, yields heterogeneous 
results. The annual cross-sections and panel data specifications mostly provide evidence in 
favour of the second hypothesis: the federal government was likely to use its power for tax 
arrears manipulation when it became strong, but regional authorities did not use this instru-
ment at the point of their strength. The results change, however, if we control for endogeneity 
through TSLS: these specifications mostly yield evidence in favour of the first hypothesis, 
suggesting use of strategic tax collection by regions under Yeltsin in order to achieve de-facto 
decentralisation. 
Given high political and economic asymmetry of the Russian federalism, we also es-
timate the regressions after exclusion of outliers and by using median regressions. We indeed 
find evidence, that our results obtained at previous stages of analysis were partly driven by a 
small number of regions with extraordinary high levels of per capita tax arrears. Nevertheless, 
most specifications and estimation methods yield evidence in favour of the first hypothesis. 
TSLS and median regressions also mostly provide hypothesis-consistent sign of the tax ar-
rears under Putin; however, the results are by far less robust and often insignificant. 
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Appendix A: Data 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
Average income per capita  711 1.80 1.79  0.12  16.83 
Capital funds  711 0.22 0.32  0.00  3.78 
Democratisation 711 28.44 6.25  14.00 45.00 
Distance from Moscow  711 2.37 2.73  0.00  11.88 
Dummy border region  711 0.43 0.50  0.00  1.00 
Dummy Putin  711 0.44 0.50  0.00  1.00 
Dummy republic  711 0.25 0.44  0.00  1.00 
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan  711 0.03 0.16  0.00  1.00 
Fiscal transfers  711 0.25 0.19  0.00  0.98 
Net profit  711 8.25 39.04  -78.59 705.80 
Oil and gas share  711 0.01 0.09  0.00  0.79 
Overrepresentation in the Federal Council  711 2.05 2.94  0.16  31.15 
Overrepresentation in the State Duma  711 1.21 1.05  0.49  12.32 
Population 711 1.83 1.52  0.05  10.39 
Power 711 6.99 0.70  5.70  8.50 
Retail trade  711 26.17 78.64  0.10  1178.97 
Share of Russians  711 0.77 0.24  0.01  0.97 
Share of the region in the total taxes collected on 
its territory  711 0.60 0.13 0.07  1.00 
Tax arrears squared  711 0.01 0.08  0.00  1.74 
Tax arrears squared (Putin)  711 0.01 0.08  0.00  1.74 
Tax arrears squared (Yeltsin)  711 0.00 0.01  0.00  0.06 
Territory 711 0.22 0.47  0.00  3.10 
Urbanisation 711 0.07 0.01  0.02  0.10 
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Table A2: Description of variables 
Name Description  Period  Source 
Average income 
per capita 





Capital funds  Value of tangible assets of all enterprises, bln. 
RUR 
1995-2003 Goskomstat   
Democratisation  Index of democratisation of the region, esti-
mated by the experts of the Carnegie Centre 
in Moscow. The higher value of index repre-
sents a higher democratisation level 
1995-2003  Carnegie Centre and In-




Distance between the capital of the region and 
Moscow, thousands of km, 0 for Moscow and 
Moscow oblast, identical for St. Petersburg 




1 if the region has a border to any state out-
side the Russian Federation, 0 otherwise 
1995-2003 Own  estimation 
Dummy Putin  1 if Putin was president or acting president, 0 
otherwise 
1995-2003 Own  estimation 
Dummy republic  1 if the region has the status of a republic, 0 
otherwise  
1995-2003 Own  estimation 
Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan 
1 for Tatarstan or Bashkortostan, 0 otherwise  1995-2003  Own estimation 
Net profit  Net profit (profit – loss) of all region’s or-
ganisations, bln. RUR 
1995-2003 Goskomstat 
Oil & gas share  (Share of oil extraction in the region in the 
total oil extraction in Russia + Share of the 
gas extraction in the region to the total gas 
extraction in Russia) / 2 
1995-2003 Goskomstat 
Overrepresentation 
in the Federal 
Council 
Share of seats of the region in the Federal 
Council (including seats of subordinate 
autonomous okrugs) / Share of region in Rus-
sian population 
1995-2003  Goskomstat, own estima-
tion 
Overrepresentation 
in the State Duma 
Share of seats of the region in the State Duma 
(calculated on 225 deputies basis) / Share of 
region in Russian population 
1995-2003  Goskomstat, State Duma, 
own estimation 
Population  Population of the region, mln. people  1995-2003  Goskomstat 
Power   Index of power of regional governors, based 
on data like years in office, share on regional 
elections, control of parliament etc. The 
higher value of index represents a higher in-





Retail trade  Total retail trade revenue (current prices), bln. 
RUR 
1995-2003 Goskomstat 
Share of fiscal 
transfers 
Fiscal transfers from other governments / To-
tal expenditures of the region’s consolidated 
budget 
1995-2003  Until 1997:  Freinkman, 
Treisman and Titov, 1999 
Since 1998: Ministry of 
Finance
9
                                                           
7   In 1998 the Russian rubl was denominated; therefore all indicators for previous years were divided by 1000. 
8   All Goskomstat (Russian statistical authority) data are published in the Regions of Russia database. 
9    The budget data are provided by the Institute of Public Finance, Centre for Fiscal Policy (Moscow) 
(www.fpcenter.ru) databank and by the databank Russian Budget supported by the Moscow State University 
(www.budgetrf.ru).  
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Name Description  Period  Source 
Share of region in 
the total taxes col-
lected on its terri-
tory 
Tax revenue of the consolidated regional 
budget executed / Total tax collection on the 
territory of the region  
1995-2003  Until 1997:  Freinkman, 
Treisman and Titov, 1999 
Since 1998: Ministry of 
Finance (for budget data), 
State Tax Service and 
Goskomstat (for tax col-
lection data) 





Russia’s Census, 2002 
Tax arrears 
squared 
(Total tax arrears / GRP)^2  1995-2003  State Tax Service and 
Goskomstat 
Territory  Territory of the region, mln. sq.km, 0 for 
Moscow and St. Petersburg 
1995-2003 Goskomstat 
Urbanisation  Share of urban population  1995-2003  Goskomstat – 37 – 
 
                                                 
Table A3: Correlation matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Share of the region in the total taxes   c o l l e c t e d   o n   i t s   t e r r i t o r y 1 0 0                          1 .
A v e r a g e   i n c o m e   p e r   c a p i t a   0 0                      
e   1 0 0                     
e   6 0 0 0                    
i t   5 3 8 0 0                   
                   
                  
                 
                  
                 
              
             
            
           
          
         
        
       
      
       
  
2   - 0 . 2 5 1 .
O i l   a n d   g a s   s h a r 3   - 0 . 0 5 0 . 8 1 .
R e t a i l   t r a d 4   - 0 . 2 1 0 . 3 0 . 5 1 .
N e t   p r o f 5   - 0 . 1 7 0 . 9 0 . 0 0 . 7 1 .
Capital  funds 6  -0.23 0.63 0.51 0.71 0.76 1.00
Tax  arrears  squared 7  -0.21 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 1.00
Dummy  Tatarstan  and  Bashkortostan 8  0.12 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.00 1.00
Territory 9  0.15 0.22 0.29 -0.01 0.11 0.19 -0.01 -0.04 1.00
Population 10  -0.16 0.24 0.12 0.62 0.48 0.65 -0.06 0.22 -0.01  1.00
Dummy  border  region 11  0.12 -0.03 0.12 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.06  -0.08  1.00
Distance  from  Moscow 12  0.26 0.16 -0.02 -0.12 -0.08 -0.12 0.01 -0.07 0.43  -0.27  0.22 1.00
Dummy  republic 13  0.02 -0.11 -0.05 -0.12 -0.07 -0.18 0.10 0.28 0.03  -0.27  -0.04 0.00 1.00
Overrepresentation  in  the  Federal  Council 14  0.01 0.19 -0.03 -0.14 -0.09 -0.24 0.10 -0.09 0.12  -0.43  0.07 0.49 0.11 1.00
Overrepresentation  in  the  State  Duma 15  -0.03 0.23 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.13 0.09 -0.05 0.11  -0.24  0.04 0.43 -0.02 0.96 1.00
Power 16  -0.03 0.23 0.22 0.13 0.17 0.26 0.02 0.14 0.41  0.17  -0.13 0.29 0.10 0.16 0.18 1.00
Fiscal  transfers 17  0.03 -0.06 -0.15 -0.19 -0.19 -0.34 0.02 -0.13 -0.10  -0.49  0.21 0.28 0.39 0.41 0.29 -0.19 1.00
Share  of  Russians 18  0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.08 0.03 0.11 -0.11 -0.27 -0.07  0.20  -0.09 -0.08 -0.83 -0.25 -0.16 -0.19 -0.48 1.00
Democratisation 19  -0.08 0.18 0.06 0.15 0.12 0.29 -0.09 -0.20 0.07  0.34  -0.21 -0.15 -0.37 -0.31 -0.22 0.18 -0.52 0.48 1.00
Urbanisation 20  0.31 0.09 0.32 0.07 0.23 0.34 -0.10 0.00 0.08  -0.50 0.41  -0.19 -0.15 0.06 -0.08 0.23 -0.56 0.50 0.55 1.00
Dummy  Putin  21  -0.37 0.61 0.00 0.19 0.15 0.24 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.08 0.01 1.00    
Tax arrears squared (Putin)  22  -0.23 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 1.00 -0.01 -0.02  -0.07  -0.05 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.11 -0.08 -0.11 0.11 1.00
Tax arrears squared (Yeltsin)  23  0.22 -0.25 0.03 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 0.04 0.09 0.03  0.00  -0.06 0.08 0.00 0.14 0.16 0.11 -0.08 -0.03 -0.11 0.09 -0.50 -0.05 1.00 
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Appendix B: Robust regressions (after exclusion of outliers)
10
Table B1: Regressions for individual annual cross-sections, 1995-2003, dependent variable: share of tax revenue 
attributed to regional government 
Variable  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Tax structure            
0.082 0.040 -0.046 0.030 0.063  0.077*  0.002 -0.027 0.002  Average income 
per capita  (0.087)  (0.066) (0.080) (0.038) (0.045) (0.044)  (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) 
0.513 0.315 -0.010  -0.164 0.158 -0.546 0.025 -0.319 -0.490  Oil & gas share 
(0.331) (0.208) (0.261) (0.180) (0.291) (0.376) (0.423) (0.735) (0.642) 
0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.002  -0.001  -0.002*  0.000 -0.000 -0.001  Retail trade 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
-0.002  -0.016** -0.010**  -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001  0.002  Net profit 
(0.008)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
-1.268 -0.195 0.369  0.263 -0.375 0.130 0.052 0.015 0.015  Capital funds 
(0.870) (0.278)  (0.38)  (0.258) (0.318) (0.168) (0.127) (0.177) (0.177) 
Legal factors            
0.158*** 0.227***  0.069  0.195*** 0.287***  0.171**  0.031  -0.157***  -0.054  Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan  (0.051) (0.052) (0.057)  (0.042) (0.069) (0.078) (0.067)  (0.058)  (0.064) 
-5.143 -0.539 -0.635 1.235* -3.134  -2.381*** -1.393*** -0.238*** -0.258***  Tax arrears 
squared  (3.310) (2.053) (1.567) (0.618) (1.985) (0.697) (0.222) (0.043) (0.058) 
Political var.           
0.071***  0.023 0.032 0.009 0.036 -0.032  0.051** 0.045*  0.027  Territory 
(0.022)  (0.023) (0.032) (0.023) (0.038) (0.040) (0.020) (0.026) (0.033) 
0.026 0.011 -0.029  -0.031*  0.030 -0.003 0.008 0.010 0.023  Population 
(0.020) (0.015) (0.023) (0.019)  (0.022) (0.021) (0.015) (0.027) (0.035) 
0.017 0.015 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.004 0.031 0.036 0.018  Dummy border 
region  (0.011) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.026) (0.031) 
0.010***  0.004 0.000 0.004 -0.006 0.001 0.002 0.007  0.012*  Distance from 
Moscow  (0.004)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
0.047*  0.027 0.049 0.037 0.038  0.150*** 0.112** 0.209***  0.086  Dummy republic 
(0.028)  (0.038) (0.048) (0.039) (0.053) (0.054) (0.048) (0.071) (0.066) 
0.006 0.016 0.028 -0.012  -0.003 -0.017 0.011  0.004 -0.015  Overrepresenta-
tion in Federal 
Council   (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.023) (0.024) 
-0.028 -0.024 -0.055 0.039  0.018 0.052 -0.051  -0.018 0.017  Overrepresenta-
tion in State 
Duma  (0.032) (0.041) (0.058) (0.046) (0.060) (0.060) (0.044) (0.058) (0.063) 
-0.020* -0.016  -0.009  0.013  -0.013 -0.009 0.009  0.006  0.001  Power (Jarocin-
ska)  (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) 
0.026  -0.147*  -0.065  0.099*  0.135 0.167  0.272***  0.111  0.342**  Fiscal transfers 
(0.069)  (0.082)  (0.118)  (0.058)  (0.102) (0.114) (0.085)  (0.120)  (0.168) 
-0.015 0.013 0.072 0.019 0.129 0.306*  0.159* 0.334***  0.285**  Share of Russians 
(0.055) (0.073) (0.091) (0.060) (0.098) (0.126) (0.082) (0.105) (0.108) 
0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.000 -0.004  -0.003  -0.003  -0.005*  -0.002  Democratisation 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.003) 
-0.010 0.995 2.606  -1.904* 3.807*  0.121  3.216** 2.670*  2.514  Urbanisation 
(0.925) (0.843) (1.767) (1.065) (2.126) (1.359)  (1.238) (1.573) (1.880) 
0.751 0.643 0.639 0.609 0.346 0.257 0.054 0.169 0.088  Constant 
(0.105) (0.119) (0.169) (0.129) (0.181) (0.194) (0.162) (0.240) (0.280) 
R
2 0.719 0.557 0.402 0.740 0.512 0.562 0.698 0.581 0.522 
F-test  32.66*** 28.55*** 29.59***  738.01*** 31.38***  41.83  50.72*** 291.38*** 32.64*** 
No. obs. (without 
outliers) 
78 78 77 75 78 76 73 77 79 
Jarque-Bera 
(without outliers) 
0.613 1.793 0.375 1.349 4.392 0.903 1.322  0.54  3.419 



















Notes: see table 1.  
                                                           
10   Outliers are excluded until Jarque Bera test becomes insignificant 
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Tax structure        
-0.020***  0.005  -0.010**  -0.003  Average income per 
capita  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
0.023 3.355  -0.010  1.338  Oil & gas share 
(0.025) (4.360)  (0.034)  (4.150) 
0.000*  0.000 0.000 0.000  Retail trade 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.000 -0.000  0.000  0.000  Net profit 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
-0.036*** -0.062***  -0.027  -0.075***  Capital funds 
(0.019) (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.017) 
Legal factors       
0.129***  -  0.120***  -  Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan  (0.033)  -  (0.033)  - 
Political variables         
0.037***  -  0.035***  -  Territory 
(0.007)  -  (0.007)  - 
-0.013*** 0.081***  -0.012***  0.055***  Population 
(0.004) (0.021)  (0.005)  (0.019) 
0.027***  -  0.030***  -  Dummy border re-
gion  (0.007)  -  (0.008)  - 
0.007***  -  0.006***  -  Distance from Mos-
cow  (0.002)  -  (0.002)  - 
0.082***  -  0.081***  -  Dummy republic 
(0.018)  -  (0.019)  - 
-0.004  -0.050***  -0.002  -0.040***  Overrepresentation 
in Federal Council   (0.007)  (0.017)  (0.007)  (0.016) 
0.006 0.048  0.002  0.030  Overrepresentation 
in State Duma  (0.019) (0.042)  (0.019)  (0.038) 
-0.002 -  -0.007  -  Power (Jarocinska) 
(0.006) -  (0.006)  - 
0.058*  -0.005  0.051*  0.019  Fiscal transfers 
(0.032)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.028) 
0.152***  -  0.145***  -  Share of Russians 
(0.032)  -  (0.035)  - 
-0.001 -0.002  -0.000  -0.001  Democratisation 
(0.001) (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
0.379 5.166  0.611  2.189  Urbanisation 
(0.408) (4.041)  (0.456)  (3.303) 
-  -0.077*** -0.061***  -  Dummy Putin 
-  (0.009) (0.011)  - 
1.896*** 1.238**  1.927***  1.347**  Arrears (Yeltsin) 
(0.499) (0.536)  (0.409)  (0.522) 
-0.283***  -0.037  -0.272***  -0.018  Arrears (Putin) 
(0.035)  (0.034)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
0.485 0.131  0.501  -0.223  Constant 
(0.056) (0.287)  (0.061)  (0.383) 
Region fixed effects  No  Yes No Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes  No No  Yes 
R
2 0.635 0.022  0.539  0.001 
F-test 36.07***  46.74***  44.37***  70.71*** 
No. obs. (without 
outliers) 
665 692  665  681 
Jarque-Bera 
(without outliers) 
3.098 0.853  2.237  3.872 
Notes: see table 2. 
Outliers (regression (1)): Altai (Rep.) (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001); Chukotka  (1998); Dagestan (1995); In-
gushetia (1995; 1996; 1997; 1999; 2000; 2001); Kabardino-Balkaria (2001); Kalmykia (1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 
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2000; 2001); Karelia (2002); Khakassia (2001; 2002); Lipetsk (2000; 2001; 2002); Magadan (2000; 2001; 2002; 
2003); Mordovia (2000; 2001; 2002; 2003); Omsk (2000; 2002); Riazan (2001); Sakha (1995); Tatarstan (2003); 
Tomsk (2003); Tyva (1995; 1996; 1997; 2001; 2002); Vologda (1998). 
Outliers (regression (2)): Altai (Rep.) (1995; 1996; 1999; 2000); Amur (2003); Ingushetia (2002; 2003); Kal-
mykia (1995); Magadan (2002; 2003); Mordovia (1995; 1998; 2000; 2001; 2002); Omsk (2000; 2002); Sakha 
(1995). 
Outliers (regression (3)): Altai (Rep.) (1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002); Amur (2003); Chukotka (1998, 2002); 
Cheliabinsk (1999); Chita (2003); Dagestan (1995; 1998); Ingushetia (1995; 1996; 1997; 1999; 2000; 2001); 
Kabardino-Balkaria (2001); Kalmykia (1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001); Khakassia (2001; 2002); Lipetsk (2000; 
2002; 2003); Magadan (2000; 2002; 2003); Mordovia (2000; 2001; 2002); Novosibirsk (2001); Omsk (2000; 
2002); Riazan (2001); Sakha (1995); Tomsk (1999); Tyva (2002; 2003); Vologda (1998). 
Outliers (regression (4)): Altai (Rep.) (1995; 1996; 1999; 2000; 2003); Amur (2003); Ingushetia (1998; 2002; 
2003); Kabardino-Balkaria (2001; 2003); Kalmykia (1995; 1996); Khakassia (2001); Lipetsk (1995); Magadan 
(2001; 2002; 2003); Mordovia (1995; 1998; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003); Northern Ossetia (2003); Omsk (2000; 
2002); Sakha (1995); Tatarstan (2002; 2003) 
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Appendix C: Robust regressions (after exclusion of outliers and Kalmykia)
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Table C1: Regressions for individual annual cross-sections, 1995-2003, dependent variable: share of tax revenue 
attributed to regional government 
Variable  1995  1996 1997  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Tax structure               
0.067 0.021  -0.046 0.030 0.055 0.061 0.004 -0.025 0.004  Average income 
per capita  (0.085) (0.062)  (0.080) (0.038) (0.036) (0.042) (0.016) (0.020) (0.022) 
0.429 0.239  -0.010  -0.164 0.073  -0.452 0.132 -0.218 -0.499  Oil & gas share 
(0.314) (0.195) (0.261) (0.1804) (0.263) (0.386) (0.442) (0.714) (0.646) 
0.001 0.001  0.002 -0.002  -0.001 -0.002 0.001  0.000 -0.001  Retail trade 
(0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
-0.000  -0.016** -0.010**  -0.001  0.000 0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.002  Net profit 
(0.007)  (0.006) (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
-1.107 -0.040 0.369  0.262  -0.381 0.006 0.166 0.042 0.013  Capital funds 
(0.830) (0.246)  (0.381) (0.258) (0.279) (0.186) (0.139) (0.173) (0.178) 
Legal factors              
0.145*** 0.199***  0.069  0.195*** 0.250*** 0.187**  0.075  -0.155***  -0.059  Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan  (0.052) (0.047)  (0.057)  (0.042) (0.064)  (0.086)  (0.048)  (0.056)  (0.063) 
-4.157 0.056  -0.635 1.235*  -0.596 1.828  -7.236***  -4.144  0.620**  Tax arrears 
squared  (3.190) (1.942)  (1.567) (0.618)  (1.815) (1.799) (2.460)  (2.787)  (0.240) 
Political variables              
0.070***  0.018 0.032  0.009  0.029 -0.035 0.056 0.043 0.025  Territory 
(0.023)  (0.021) (0.032)  (0.023)  (0.034) (0.037) (0.022) (0.027) (0.032) 
0.021 0.002  -0.029  -0.031*  0.019 -0.005 -0.004 0.003 0.030  Population 
(0.020) (0.013)  (0.023) (0.019)  (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.026) (0.034) 
0.012 0.008  0.019 0.020 0.019 0.003 0.021 0.029 0.015  Dummy border 
region  (0.010) (0.014)  (0.020) (0.015) (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.019) (0.0273) (0.031) 
0.009**  0.004 0.000  0.004  -0.004 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.011  Distance from 
Moscow  (0.004)  (0.003) (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
0.048*  0.030 0.049  0.037  0.034  0.159*** 0.124*** 0.212***  0.084  Dummy republic 
(0.028)  (0.039) (0.048)  (0.039)  (0.051) (0.052) (0.043) (0.070) (0.067) 
0.005 0.017  0.028 -0.012  -0.006 -0.024 0.011  0.004 -0.007  Overrepresentation 
in Federal Council   (0.014) (0.016)  (0.023) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.023) (0.023) 
-0.026 -0.023  -0.055  0.039  0.014 0.048 -0.037  -0.011  -0.004  Overrepresentation 
in State Duma  (0.032) (0.042)  (0.058) (0.046) (0.056) (0.056) (0.041) (0.058) (0.061) 
-0.019*  -0.014 -0.009  0.013  -0.012 -0.001 0.005 0.002 -0.004  Power (Jarocin-
ska)  (0.010)  (0.013) (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) 
0.058  -0.117*  -0.065  0.099*  0.100 0.136  0.292***  0.111  0.337**  Fiscal transfers 
(0.065)  (0.070)  (0.118)  (0.058)  (0.093) (0.110) (0.078)  (0.118)  (0.166) 
-0.015 0.0072 0.072  0.019  0.103  0.326*** 0.185** 0.331*** 0.270**  Share of Russians 
(0.054) (0.067)  (0.091) (0.060) (0.089)  (0.117) (0.073) (0.101) (0.107) 
-0.000 0.000  -0.004 0.000 -0.004  -0.000  -0.004* -0.008**  -0.002  Democratisation 
(0.002)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
-0.071 0.788 2.606 -1.904*  2.813 -1.715  3.991*** 3.279**  2.569  Urbanisation 
(0.952) (0.856)  (1.767) (1.065)  (2.759) (1.326) (1.093) (1.501) (1.852) 
0.766 0.669  0.639 0.609 0.435 0.262 0.048 0.205 0.119  Constant 
(0.103) (0.114)  (0.169) (0.129) (0.168) (0.193) (0.159) (0.231) (0.274) 
R
2 0.744  0.589 0.402  0.740  0.482 0.512 0.640 0.508 0.453 
F-test  28.90*** 22.06*** 29.59*** 738.01*** 35.64*** 62.86*** 32.75*** 20.52*** 48.70*** 
No.  obs.  77  77 77  75  77 75 72 76 78 
Notes: see table 1.  
                                                           
11   Outliers are listed in Appendix B 
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Tax structure        
-0.020***  0.005  -0.011  -0.004  Average income per 
capita  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.006)**  (0.006) 
0.022 2.810  -0.010  1.319  Oil & gas share 
(0.025) (4.268)  (0.035)  (4.108) 
0.000*  0.000 0.000  0.000  Retail trade 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.000 -0.000  0.000  0.000  Net profit 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
-0.035* -0.063***  -0.024  -0.073***  Capital funds 
(0.018) (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.017) 
Legal factors        
0.128***  -  0.116***  -  Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan  (0.033)  -  (0.033)  - 
Political variables         
0.037***  -  0.035***  -  Territory 
(0.007)  -  (0.007)  - 
-0.013*** 0.088***  -0.013***  0.057***  Population 
(0.004) (0.022)    (0.005)  (0.019) 
0.026***  -  0.028***  -  Dummy border re-
gion  (0.007)  -  (0.008)  - 
0.007***  -  0.006***  -  Distance from Mos-
cow  (0.002)  -  (0.002)  - 
0.082***  -  0.082***  -  Dummy republic 
(0.018)  -  (0.019)  - 
-0.003  -0.051***  -0.002  -0.039**  Overrepresentation 
in Federal Council   (0.007)  (0.017)  (0.007)  (0.016) 
0.002 0.050  0.004  0.028  Overrepresentation 
in State Duma  (0.018) (0.042)  (0.019)  (0.038) 
-0.002 -  -0.006  -  Power (Jarocinska) 
(0.006) -  (0.006)  - 
0.059*  -0.025  0.051*  0.012  Fiscal transfers 
(0.032)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.028) 
0.150***  -  0.143***  -  Share of Russians 
(0.032)  -  (0.035)  - 
-0.001 -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  Democratisation 
(0.001) (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
0.307  7.102*  0.586 2.533  Urbanisation 
(0.412)  (3.812)  (0.470) (3.357) 
-  -0.078*** -0.059***  -  Dummy Putin 
-  (0.009) (0.013)  - 
1.969*** 1.711***  1.870***  1.635***  Arrears (Yeltsin) 
(0.502) (0.503)  (0.413)  (0.573) 
0.493** 0.836***  -0.602  0.636***  Arrears (Putin) 
(0.249) (0.223)  (1.078)  (0.180) 
Constant  0.491 -0.025  0.506  1.069 
  (0.056) (0.271)  (0.061)  (0.270) 
Region fixed effects  No  Yes No  Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes  No No  Yes 
R
2 0.618 0.010  0.514  0.001 
F-test 32.38***  30.87***  29.81***  41.27*** 
No. obs.  662  684  661  674 
Notes: see table 2. 
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